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DEFAMATION
SLANDER - EXTENT OF PRIVILEGE
The plaintiff, Sarah McKenna, was an employee of the Mansfield
Leland Hotel Company. The manager of the company in the presence
of the supervisor, who was the immediate superior of the plaintiff,
charged the latter with taking a quantity of butter and as a result the
plaintiff was dismissed. Later a prospective employer sought a recom-
mendation of the plaintiff. The manager refused to give the recom-
mendation and, on the insistence of the prospective employer, explained
that he believed butter had been taken by the plaintiff. The trial court
sustained the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and on appeal
the judgment was affirmed. McKenna v. The Mansfield Leland Hotel
Co., 55 Ohio App. 163, 9 N.E. (2d) 166 (1937).
The plaintiff made out a prima facie cause of action for slander.
The words might reasonably be understood to constitute a charge of
crime. McDonald v. Louthen, 136 Ark. 368, 2o6 S.W. 674. (1918)3
Koontz v. Weide, iii Kans. 709, 208 Pac. 651 (1922). A publica-
tion is made when words are spoken so that a third person hears and
understands them. Hedgpeth v. Coleman, 183 N.C. 309, inl S.E.
517, 24 A.L.R. 232 (1922); Massee v. Williams, 207 F. 222, 124
C.C.A. 492 (1913). There was a publication by the manager in both
instances. There is some doubt as to whether the first statement was a
publication by the corporation. Contrast, Globe Furniture Co. v.
Wright, 49 App. D.C. 315, 265 F. 873 (1920); and Prins v. Hl-
land North A4merica Mortgage Co., 107 Wash. 2o6, 181 Pac. 68o,
5 A.L.R. 451 (1919). But the statement to the prospective employer
was dearly a publication by the corporation. Even so the defendant
might be protected by a claim of privilege and the real issue is whether
a conditional privilege exists.
A conditional privilege is said to exist when a communication is made
in good faith and without malice by one who has an interest in the
subject matter to one having a corresponding interest. Baker v. Clark,
i86 Ky. 816, 218 S.W. 280 (1920); Fahey v Shafer, 98 Wash. 517,
167 Pac. 1118 (1917).
Here the first statement was made to the employee in the presence
of the supervisor. But if both the manager and the supervisor have a
sufficient interest, as they do here, it would seem that a conditional priv-
ilege exists.
The court says that there was no evidence of malice and cites 98
A.L.R. 1301 which states that a conditional privilege cannot be rebutted
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except by proof of actual malice. This is the orthodox view. Pophe v.
Hoffman, 21 Ohio App. 454, 153 N.E. 248 (1926); Ely v. Mason,
97 Conn. 38, 115 Ad. 479 (1921). But there is some authority for
saying that a lack of probable cause would defeat the privilege. Holway
v. World Pub. Co., 171 Okla. 306, 44 Pac. (2d) 88I (1935); Hodg-
kins v. Gallager, 122 Me. 112, 119 Ad. 68 (1922).
The manager's statement to the prospective employer was also con-
ditionally privileged. When statements about a servant are volunteered,
courts frequently insist that the defendant, if he is to be privileged,
should have a legal or, at least, a moral duty to speak. Fresh v. Cutter,
73 Md. 87, 2o Atl. 774, 25 Am. St. Rep. 575, IO L.R.A. 67 (1890);
The Norfolk and Washington Steamboat Co. v. Davis, 12 App. D.C.
3o6 (1898). But when the information is given in response to a bona
fide inquiry by some one who has an interest in the subject matter, it is
clear that the occasion is privileged. Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass. 171,
107 N.E. 62o, L.R.A. 1915 C, 774, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 338 (1915);
Solow v. General Motor Truck Co., 64 F (2d) 105 (1933); Rosen-
baum v. Roche, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 237, 101 S.W. 1164 (1907).
Again malice would rebut the privilege but the court finds no evidence
of that here.
The court's holding that whether the occasion was privileged or
not, when the facts are undisputed as they were here, was a question
for the court, is in fine with the great weight of authority. Mauk v.
Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E. 152, 62 L.R.A. 477 (1903);
Stewart v. Riley, 114 W. Va. 578, 172 S.E. 791 (i934); annotation
in 26 A.L.R. 833.
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DESCENT
INHERITANCE OF DESIGNATED HEIR THROUGH DECLARANT
George Crommer, brother of Ida Shaffer Smith, designated as his
heir-at-law Minnie M. Frazee who was the mother of defendants Lu
Ella Banta and La '1 aska Grace. George Crommer and Minnie M.
Frazee died before Ida Shaffer Smith. Delia M. Rogers et al, heirs of
Ida Shaffer Smith, filed a petition in common pleas court seeking the
partition of real estate descending from Ida Shaffer Smith. In a cross
petition, defendants Lu Ella Banta and La Taska Grace allege their
right to part of this estate claiming as heirs of Ida Shaffer Smith. The
common pleas court held that defendants had no such right. The court
